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One of the key aims of a development supportive international financial architecture –that 
is, one supporting growth and poverty reduction— is the provision of adequate 
countercyclical official liquidity in the face of external shocks.  
 
External shocks tend to have very large negative effects on developing economies’ 
growth, investment and poverty. As such, they can be very harmful for meeting the 
MDGs. When a developing country suffers an external shock, the trade balance, fiscal 
accounts and the overall level of economic activity suffers. The initial effects on these 
key macroeconomic variables feed through the entire economy, with very negative social 
and economic effects taking place through reduced government spending, lower private 
investment, lower wages, higher unemployment, and therefore higher poverty (see for 
example Guillaumont et al, 2003; IMF, 2003).  
 
These shocks are very costly both for low- and middle-income countries. Low-income 
countries have more limited room to build cushions of reserves and fiscal resources as a 
buffer against shocks. Such "self-insurance" in the form of higher reserves may have a 
particularly high opportunity cost for low-income countries, but also have high costs for 
middle-income countries.1 These costs are both the opportunity costs of not using such 
reserves for higher investment or consumption as well as direct financial ones. The latter 
include both the social losses incurred by countries associated to the difference between 
interest rates earned on reserves and the average cost of external liabilities, as well as, for 
central banks, the difference between the former and the costs of open market operations 
(to the extent that the monetary effect of reserve accumulation is sterilized using this 
policy instrument). The decline of the U.S. dollar, in which these reserves are mainly 
held, has further added to these financial costs of holding reserves (see Rodrik, 2006 and 
Cortez, Izurieta and Vos, 2008). As a result, effective official compensatory flows can 
play a crucial role in avoiding unnecessary costs to developing countries and poor people, 
both by reducing the need to hold such high levels of reserves and – more importantly – 
by helping avoid unnecessary adjustment. As regards the former, the existence of 
adequate and reliable official compensatory facilities would reduce – but clearly not 
eliminate – the need for a minimum prudent level of countries’ foreign exchange 
reserves. 
 
Thus, provision of appropriate official liquidity and aid can potentially be very effective 
for protecting economic growth (and the income of poor people) from the negative 
impact of economic shocks, whether these relate to terms of trade, volatility of private 
capital flows or natural disasters.  In this paper we focus mainly on shocks arising from 
trade; we therefore do not examine issues related to volatility of capital flows or natural 
disasters, even though there are also important. Indeed, external shocks due to natural 
disasters may increase, given likely trends in climate change, though it seems desirable to 
separate direct financing for natural disaster alleviation from financing for terms of trade 
                                                 
1 During 2007-2008, even many low-income countries have accumulated fairly large levels of foreign 
exchange reserves; this is in part owing to a deliberate policy attempt at greater “self-insurance”; however, 
it is also due to good luck in the terms of trade trends, which may be temporary. 
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shocks; it seems appropriate to expand the latter, also to cope with possible indifrect 
effects of natural disasters, e.g. droughts in other countries, on terms of trade. 
 
The current international environment of strong commitment to the MDGs and of 
increased aid, as well as the potential increases in resources that the innovative sources of 
finance initiative will hopefully generate, is in many ways very favourable for providing 
adequate official liquidity and aid for shocks; this requires an appropriate architecture for 
economic shock financing be put in place, and ensuring sufficient resources are made 
available for this aim. Such an architecture would build on existing institutional 
mechanisms and instruments, but would modify them significantly so the system would 
be effective in providing appropriate support (in terms of amounts, speed, modality, 
conditions) to minimise negative unnecessary impacts of shocks on growth. Existing 
contingency financing mechanisms provide too few resources, do so too slowly and carry 
excessive and inappropriate conditionality. 
 
There is a great urgency to improve existing compensatory financing mechanisms 
quickly and/or design new ones where gaps exist. This urgency arises firstly from the fact 
that the global economic outlook has turned gloomy and that developing countries 
(especially LDCs) are likely to be highly vulnerable to a slowdown in the developed 
economies (see again Cortez, Izurieta and Vos, 2008). Secondly, this urgency is greater 
given major increases in the price of many foodstuffs and of oil, which will affect 
countries, that are net importers of those products. Thirdly, climate change may 
increasingly generate new shocks, both via natural disasters, but also via causing large 
changes in terms of trade. As discussed below, existing mechanisms are clearly 
inadequate, as reflected in their very limited use. Therefore, they need to be quickly 
improved. 
 
Appropriate, sufficient and speedy official compensatory financing, where necessary, 
could help developing countries to sustain growth. This would not only contribute to 
poverty reduction in those countries, but could also play a fairly important role in helping 
avoid a large slowdown in the world economy in 2008 and 2009. 
 
II. Broad Principles 
 
1. Compensatory financing and the nature of the shocks 
 
In terms of diagnosis of impact of shocks, there is much consensus on many central 
points, both in the academic literature and in official documents (see for example, IMF, 
2003). 
 
External shocks can have both short-term and long-term impacts, some of which can in 
turn be sizable in magnitude. In the first instance, all shocks have important negative 
short-term effects, if reserves and additional external finance are not available. 
 
There is therefore a clear need for rapidly disbursing, low conditionality official liquidity 
to compensate for a very large proportion of the shock (see Table 1 in relation to low-
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income countries). For low-income countries, these loans should be concessional. It is 
moreover important that the country’s fiscal policy framework be built on mechanisms 
(and that the IMF and donors accept them, or even better, encourage them) that allow 
fiscal deficits to expand when a country is hit by a shock, rather than reduce such deficits, 
as is usually the case. This will help maintain economic activity and allow the structural 
policies necessary to manage possible long-term effects of the shock to be financed.  
 
If the shock proves to be temporary (e.g. brief deterioration of terms of trade, or one year 
drought) and were to be financed quickly for a high proportion of the shock through 
official liquidity, any negative impact on growth and poverty could be avoided. Official 
liquidity would allow levels of imports to be maintained, as well as levels of government 
spending.  This was indeed the purpose for which the Compensatory Financing Facility 
was created in 1963, a purpose that was then recognised by the IMF itself in a special 
Fund pamphlet on the subject: "Ideally, the facility would enable a member to borrow 
when its export earnings and financial reserves are low and to repay when they are high, 
so its import capacity is unaffected by fluctuations in export earnings caused by external 
events" (Goreux, 1980). Indeed, many of the principles and the design of the original 
IMF Compensatory Financing Facility (CFF, which resulted from a UN initiative, 
drawing particularly from initiatives taken at UN ECLAC and UNCTAD by Raul 
Prebisch) were appropriate for dealing with shocks. 
 
Table 1 
Shock Desirable international response for low-income countries 
Official liquidity Grants  
A.  Terms of trade 
 1.  Temporary 
 
 
 2.  Permanent 
 
Speedy, low conditionality. 
Large scale in proportion to 
shock. 
Speedy, low conditionality.  






When more permanent 
nature of shock becomes 
clearer 
 
B.  Natural disasters 
 
 
Speedy, low conditionality. 




Large and quick disbursal 
of grants. 
Source:  Griffith-Jones and Gottschalk (2005) 
 
If a shock that proves ex-post to be more permanent (e.g., terms of trade deterioration is 
not reversed, droughts repeat themselves), repayment of compensatory official liquidity 
should be automatically extended. Such flexible repayments linked to duration of shocks 
was indeed a feature of the initial CFF. Furthermore, in the case of low-income countries, 
there is a clear case for the international community to provide grants for a significant 
proportion of the long-term effects of shocks (see again Table 1). In the case of middle-
 4
income countries, there is in turn a case for the international community to provide 
parallel long-term financing to face the structural sources of the shock. 
 
There is indeed growing evidence from recent research that the duration and severity of 
commodity price shocks are hard to predict, and that some of these prices shocks may be 
persistent (see, for example, IMF, 2004a, especially Box 2). If the shock is likely to be 
more permanent, any conditions or incentives attached to loans should tackle the source 
of the problem. For example, if it seems likely that the price of the main export will 
remain low, financial support should be given for measures to encourage export 
diversification; these could include both more competitive exchange rates, but also key 
investments to facilitate such diversification. If the problem is continued high oil prices, 
investment in greater energy efficiency, as well as the search for alternative domestic 
sources of energy, is to be supported. In turn, if natural disasters recur (e.g., due to 
climate change phenomena), long-term prevention and adaptation policies are called for. 
 
In all of these cases, structural policies to adapt to the specific source of the shock are 
called for rather than traditional macroeconomic adjustment policies. Furthermore, by 
generating adverse effects on domestic economic activities, traditional contractionary 
macroeconomic adjustment policies may actually block the financing for the structural 
adjustment policies that are required. Actually, the appropriate response to such shocks 
would generally be to increase rather than reduce budget or current account deficits, as 
the counterpart of the financing of investment in structural adjustment. This responds to 
one of the essential lessons of the 1980s and 1990s: that structural adjustment to major 
external shocks is extremely costly when undertaken in the context of contractionary 
macroeconomic policies. It is, of course, essential that such investment take place, to 
guarantee that the increased short-term deficits are consistent with long-term 
macroeconomic sustainable growth. It is positive that this analysis is increasingly 
recognized by senior IMF officials, but unfortunately is not sufficiently reflected in IMF 
practices. 
 
If the shock is from the very beginning large, like a major natural disaster that destroys a 
great deal of housing, social infrastructure and/or productive capacity, there is still a 
potential role for very quick disbursing international official liquidity. This is particularly 
the case when there is a clear impact on the country’s capacity to import. However, for 
low-income countries, the key role clearly needs to be played by significant grants, which 
hopefully will also begin to be disbursed quite speedily. Should grants for some reason 
not be disbursed quickly, there would be a case for fairly large highly concessional 
official liquidity, though this would seem to be a second best. 
 
In this case, it is crucial that assistance is provided in the form of budget support also for 
dealing with natural disasters, so that the government can contain the knock on effects 
through increased social expenditure to assist the poor and most vulnerable. For that 
purpose, in-built mechanisms should be in place to allow the government to run 
temporarily larger deficits, as well as safety nets that can be activated quickly. Additional 
assistance may lose effectiveness if the country takes time to build safety nets to reach 
those affected by the shock, or fails to do so due to insufficient institutional capacity. 
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2. Detailed principles for compensatory financing 
 
The key features of the official compensatory liquidity that needs to be provided should 
follow six principles: a) it should be speedy, b) it should be sufficiently large in 
proportion to different shocks, c) it should have low or no conditionality, d) it should be 
highly concessional for low-income countries, e) there should be better alignment of 
allocation with needs, and f) shocks should be precisely measured. 
 
a) As regards the first aspect –speed—, the IMF itself clearly recognises its value. In 
IMF (2005a), a document sent to the Board, it states: "Immediate external financing 
can have a strong impact in mitigating both the direct and long-lasting secondary 
effects of shocks in low-income countries. Catalysis (of aid) can be relatively slow, 
because bilateral donors typically cannot reorient flows quickly. Together, these 
features suggest that frontloading external financing from the Fund can be an efficient 
intertemporal reallocation of resources…".2 
 
One operational way of enabling speed of response to shocks into existing IMF 
lending facilities is to build scenarios into all Fund programmes. Thus, programmes 
could include provisions that lending would automatically increase, based on previous 
calculations, should certain levels of deterioration of terms of trade or reversals of 
capital flows occur, and the programme are otherwise on track. It is positive that such 
scenario building is introduced into the Fund's new TIM (Trade Integration 
Mechanism; see below for description). Alternative scenarios are also included in 
some PRGFs, but no additional resources are predicted for such scenarios, which 
reduce their relevance and, thus, enhanced PRGF lending linked to shocks. 
 
Unfortunately, the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF), also approved by the IMF in 
2005, does not guarantee sufficiently speed of disbursement. Nor does it deal 
adequately with the second criteria, that of scale (see details below). 
 
b) As regards scale, the more liquidity is provided quickly in proportion to the shock, the 
smaller the costs of adjustment. The evidence that negative terms of trade shocks have 
large adverse effects on growth is very strong. For example, Collier and Dehn (2001) 
showed that for negative export price shocks averaging 6.8 per cent of GDP in the 
year of the shock, the loss of income due to reduced growth over four years is about 
14 per cent of initial output, with asymmetric effects, as positive shocks did not 
increase growth sufficiently to compensate for the negative effects. Furthermore, 
shocks of these size have proven to have long-term effects on the growth trajectory, 
indeed explaining the frequency of growth collapses that the developing world 
experienced since 1980 (Ocampo and Parra, 2007).  
 
Large counter-cyclical compensatory financing for external shocks could be consistent 
with counter-cyclical issues of SDRs, following the proposals made by the United 
                                                 
2 Indeed, currently donors have very small or zero contingency resources (interview material).  The EU 
FLEX is slow disbursing and quite small (see below). 
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Nations Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs (1999) and Ocampo 
(2002), among others. The existence of such SDR issues could facilitate the creation 
and expansion of compensatory financing, especially in face of generalized shocks. 
SDR issues could also be a way to fund the subsidy element in compensatory 
financing for low-income countries, following a broader framework suggested by 
Stiglitz (2006, ch. 9), among others. However, such subsidies could alternatively be 
funded by increased grants from donors to the IMF for this purpose. 
 
c) A renewal of SDR issues by the IMF may be particularly appropriate, at a time when 
the fall of the dollar may re-open the discussion on the reform of the international 
reserve system and the role which the SDR could play in it.  
 
As pointed out above, in the face of a clearly temporary negative shock, financing 
equivalent to a large proportion of the shock could avoid unnecessary costs for growth 
and poverty reduction. This is particularly clear in a context of rising aid flows (where 
compensatory financing could be understood as frontloading future aid flows) and/or 
if the temporary negative shock is followed by a positive shock. Furthermore, it can be 
argued that current trends in overall higher commodity prices linked to the dynamism 
of China and other Asian economies, together with a clear return of the business cycle 
especially in developed countries, provide a very good context for compensatory 
financing, as declines in export prices are far more likely to be temporary and possibly 
not so linked for a time to the long-term deterioration of terms of trade that Prebisch-
Singer predicted and that the IMF (2004a) refers to in its review of its Compensatory 
Financing Facility (CFF), as a possible reason for the CFF's smaller relevance. 
 
Indeed, this statement on CFF seems based on a clear misunderstanding on the 
evidence on the long-term deterioration of the terms of trade. Although valid for the 
twentieth century, such trend was the result of two major downward shocks, in the 
1920s and 1980s, not of a secular decline (Ocampo and Parra, 2003). And the 
circumstances surrounding commodity prices in the early twenty-first century, based 
on increased demand from China and other Asian economies, may be closer to those 
of the nineteenth century, where the terms of trade showed a long-term improvement 
rather than deterioration.  
 
It should be pointed out that the scale of the official liquidity for shocks is far more 
limited than in the past, when the CFF access limits reached 100 per cent of IMF 
quota, separately for export shortfalls or cereal imports, and 125 per cent of quota for 
their joint use, at a time when IMF quotas as a proportion of trade were far higher than 
at present.  It was estimated that for example for 1976-1981, on average about 50 per 
cent of export shortfalls of developing countries were financed (Griffith-Jones, 1987).3 
This is in quite a sharp contrast with current practice, where augmentation of PRGF, 
                                                 
3 As discussed below, shortfalls in the CFF were calculated as the difference between the value of exports 
in the shortfall year with the medium trend value of export earnings in that year. Overall, this seems a good 
methodology, as it implies that greater compensatory liquidity financing is provided initially when a shock 
occurs, and less liquidity financing would be given if the shock persists, as the medium trend value 
(calculated for 5 years) becomes lower. 
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granted in only about half the cases of terms of trade shocks, has reached only 12 per 
cent of quota, which the Fund estimates covers less than 20 per cent of the shortfall! 
(IMF, 2003.) For recent, even lower, figures for 2005-2008, please see Table 3 below. 
If there is a balance of payments need, and the country is following reasonable macro-
economic and poverty reduction policies, the case for 100 per cent (or at least a very 
large proportion) of coverage of shocks that are deemed temporary seems very strong, 
and even a large proportion of more permanent shocks should be financed if such 
funds are used as a temporary bridge to introduce the more structural policies required. 
This would imply either no quota limit or a far higher one. 
 
d) Low or no conditionality for official liquidity in response to exogenous shocks is 
essential for two important reasons. Firstly, the fact that a shock is totally exogenous 
implies that countries do not have to adjust in the first instance, at least until it is 
evident that it has a more permanent character. If countries had access to private 
financial markets, they could borrow, which is what developed countries do. As low-
income countries often cannot borrow, it is desirable that the international community 
provides this financing. Similarly, middle-income countries are often subjected to 
international credit rationing as their economy deteriorates; indeed, a capital flow 
reversal may be the main shock facing a middle-income country. The rationale for 
such counter-cyclical official flows seems evident in economic terms: because of the 
inevitability of international business cycles, official counter-cyclical liquidity is 
desirable to counteract for their effects. It seems unnecessary to require a high 
conditionality Fund programme, for countries that have successfully approved annual 
Art IV consultations, which reflect reasonable macro-economic policies. Furthermore, 
as discussed below, it is even clearer that low-income countries with a Policy Support 
Instrument (PSI), which has conditionality but does not provide loans, should not –as 
they now have to– fulfil additional conditions to get IMF lending if hit by shocks. 
Indeed, the introduction of a PSI is welcome in that it provides ex-ante conditionality 
to influence policy in good times, e.g. to curb excessive expansion; however, the other 
side of the coin is that countries performing well under the PSI should get automatic 
lending if hit by external shocks.  
 
Indeed, during the initial decades of the operation of the Compensatory Financing 
Facility, this principle of low conditionality in response to external shocks was fully 
recognised, and countries made extensive and successful use of this facility (see 
below). Similarly, when the first large increase in the price of oil occurred in the mid-
1970s, two low-conditional Oil Facilities were created, which worked very effectively 
and were also amply used. 
 
The second reason for low or no conditionality is that it clearly facilitates and ensures 
speed of disbursement, which is precisely a key advantage of using official liquidity to 
avoid unnecessary costs on growth and poverty reduction. Therefore, no or low 
conditionality is justified not just in terms of good economic analysis (for external 




e) Concessionality for low income countries: There is broad consensus that resources 
should be provided in the case of low-income countries, either in the form of grants or 
very concessional loans. Given that official liquidity has a number of potentially 
positive features, the case seems very strong to allocate additional grant resources to 
make such compensatory IMF facilities highly concessional (possibly even more 
concessional than the current PRGF) and, above all, not to allow restrictions on the 
levels of lending to be determined by lack of resources for financing the subsidy. A 
main reason for higher concessionality is that it would otherwise be difficult to bring 
the country’s external debt to sustainability levels in the foreseeable future, even after 
taking into account the debt relief granted under the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. 
Such a use of aid seems far more cost effective than giving (far larger) grants, and may 
also provide better incentives for countries to restructure their economies in the 
medium-term to reduce vulnerability by greater diversification, so they can pay back 
concessional loans. 
 
For large natural shocks that cause major damage, the case for significant grant 
resources is equally strong. The Mitch Hurricane shock of 1998, which implied 
massive infrastructure and property destruction both in Honduras and Nicaragua, had a 
very generous response through both the provision of grants and loans by the 
international donor community. But as these countries’ policy makers have pointed 
out, assistance in the form of loans resulted in an increase in these countries’ debt, 
which were already extremely high. 
 
f) An additional criterion, applicable also to official liquidity but particularly relevant for 
grants, is that there is a better alignment of allocation with needs. Indeed, as IMF 
(2003) and Collier and Dehn (2001) show, natural disasters, which are more visible 
appear proportionally to attract more external financing than terms of trade shocks, 
which are mainly "silent crises". For these silent and slower developing crises, more 
attention is necessary for providing both liquidity and grants. Indeed, ideally the 
provision of concessional liquidity and grants should be in some way proportional to 
the magnitude of the shock, and resulting impact on the poor and their needs, 
independently of the nature of the shock. 
 
g) Shocks need to be precisely measured: Clearly this is a complex area, but valuable 
progress has been made in the area of appraisal of impact of natural disasters.  At the 
same time, progress on measuring impact of terms of trade shocks seems less evident 
in existing facilities. A simple improvement – particularly relevant in the context of 
recent sharply rising oil and food prices, which affect many low-income countries’ 
imports and which is a source of major concern to developing countries – would be to 
measure export shortfalls in terms of export purchasing power, thus taking account of 
both changes in export prices and import prices. This would simply apply economists’ 
well established general preference for real rather than nominal values. This is 
particularly important for the calculation of export shortfalls, for the purpose of 
provision of grants, for example by the EU’s FLEX or bilateral compensatory loans, 
such as the interesting new French counter-cyclical loan facility (see Cohen, 
Djoufelkit, Jacquet and Valadier, 2008). An alternative, possibly more politically 
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attractive option –though somewhat less precise technically– would be to consider the 
creation of a new low conditional IMF Oil Facility at the IMF, and the broadening of 
the existing Compensatory Financing Facilities to include all food imports, and not 
just cereal imports, and including some provision for compensating for higher oil and 
food prices in existing grant facilities, such as FLEX (see below). Furthermore, new 
issues, especially in relation to whether fluctuations in workers’ remittances should be 
included amongst external shocks. 
 
III. Current Facilities 
 
Given the great variety of instruments and shocks, we will focus here mainly on external 
shocks linked to trade. These include two major compensatory financing mechanisms for 
terms of trade shocks: a) the Compensatory Financing Facility of the IMF (a loan facility) 
as well as IMF facilities for low-income countries (PRGF augmentation and its newer 
External Shock Facility, ESF), and the IMF facility for trade-related balance of payments 
adjustments, available to all Fund members (TIM) and b) the European Commission's 
grant programme for ACP countries (previously STABEX and Sysmin, and now FLEX),. 
 
a) IMF mechanisms for export shortfalls 
 
i) The CFF 
 
As discussed, the CFF has historically been a very important instrument by which the 
Fund helped finance exogenous shocks. During certain periods, it has played a major 
role in total IMF financing; for example, between 1976 and 1980, it represented 45 per 
cent of total credit extended by the Fund to developing countries! (Goreux, 1980)  
Even since 1990, it represented a fairly high proportion of IMF lending (see Table 2 




















Facility Percentage Use 
SRF 2.76 % 
EA 10.69 % 
SBA 63.10 % 
CFF 10.69 % 
EFF 12.76 % 
Sources: IMF and Banco de España 
 
Since its creation in 1963 till 2000, a total of SDR 25 billion was disbursed in response 
to 344 requests for assistance. As regards the share of the shortfall covered by IMF 
lending, these reached a fairly large proportion at times, of around 50 per cent of the 
shortfall. This was because, as discussed above, the limits for drawing –as per cent of 
quota—were fairly high. As a result, a large number of countries received CFF with a 
high per cent of average access in proportion to shortfall. Furthermore, when major oil 
price increases occurred in the 1970s, Oil Facilities were introduced, which were also 
widely used, even in the 1990s (see IMF, 2004a). The high number of countries using 
the CFF was linked not just to generous access, as proportion to quota, but also to very 
low conditionality, as appropriate due to the fact that shocks were exogenous.   
 
The form in which shortfalls were calculated was interesting, in that it did not require 
a fall in export earnings (as FLEX does). The shortfall was estimated as the difference 
between the value of exports in the shortfall year, with the medium-trend value of 
export earnings in that year (calculated as a five year average centred on that year). 
This seems a more appropriate calculation method, as it takes into account the fact that 
a deceleration of export growth could lead to a fall of output below its long-term 
growth trend, and a below-trend output is precisely what one should try to avoid when 
an economy is hit by a shock.  So, a fall in export growth rates, and not just a fall in 
export earnings, should be the criteria for financial assistance for a country facing an 
external shock. 
 
Finally, another positive feature of the traditional CFF –from a development 
perspective—was that financing under the CFF augmented total resources available to 
countries, beyond access limits for the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) or stand-by. 
 
However, since the 2000 review and amendment, which made the conditionality 
attached to the CFF linked to that of upper credit tranche borrowing and therefore very 
high, the CFF has not been used at all, despite several temporary and exogenous 
shocks that affected many countries. Indeed, the IMF (2004a) itself recognizes that 
when shocks happened since 2000, and especially in the face of the shock of 
September 11, 2001, countries needed the CFF but did not or could not use it. For 
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example, at least one country, according to the IMF, preferred to tighten fiscal and 
monetary policy than recur to the CFF. It seems clear that one of the main reasons why 
the CFF has not been used since it was modified is because of its very high 
conditionality: requests for CFF can be met only in conjunction with an upper credit 
tranche arrangement, if the balance of payments is deemed not to be satisfactory. 
Naturally, another reason is that recently –due to high commodity prices– there may 
have been less need for such lending; however, this second reason is likely to change 
as the world economy slows down, or as net importers of food and oil face Balance of 
Payments constraints. Furthermore, for low-income countries, especially highly 
indebted ones, the fact that the CFF is non-concessional is an additional reason for 
making it unattractive. 
 
 ii) PRGF augmentation 
 
Since the creation of the PRGF, augmentation of PRGF arrangements has been the 
main vehicle the Fund has used to provide financing for low-income countries hit by 
shocks.  This mechanism has the main advantage that financing is concessional. But 
this mechanism has a number of problems. Firstly, it is restricted to only some low-
income countries, those with PRGF programmes. Consequently, it is linked to a high 
conditionality Fund arrangement, which as discussed above is inappropriate as terms 
of trade shocks are caused by external circumstances. Secondly, as the Fund itself 
recognised (IMF, 2005a), PRGF average augmentation was very small compared to 
the impact of the shock; furthermore, it was granted to only half the countries with 
PRGF experiencing shocks. As can be seen in Table 3 below, the total amount of 
PRGF augmentation provided between early 2005 and early 2008 was extremely low, 
at below 200 million SDRs, and represented very low proportions of quotas and 
shocks. 
 
Conscious that PRGF augmentation is limited only to countries with PRGF 
programmes, and that exogenous shocks affect all low-income countries, the IMF for a 
couple of years explored alternative options. 
 
 iii) The unused ESF 
 
In 2005, a second PRGF window was created, for low-income countries that faced a 
sudden and exogenous shock requiring temporary financing without a PRGF 
arrangement. It was called the ESF (or External Shocks Facility). It has several 
positive features, such as that it is concessional and that it could apply to different 
shocks, including natural disasters as well as commodity price changes, though not to 
increases in the price of imports (e.g. of oil, or most food), currently a very important 
shock for many low-income countries. It would therefore seem essential to broaden 
this new facility –as well as the PRGF augmentation mechanism— to include prices of 
imports, and to estimate all shortfalls in terms of export purchasing power (or, what is 
equivalent, capacity to import).  
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The second and main problem with the ESF is linked to conditionality. This can take 
two different forms: if a country requests first a PSI (a Policy Support Instrument) 
which has conditionality but no lending, and if it then negotiates adjustments to the 
PSI to get an ESF loan, there is additional conditionality, which seems particularly 
problematic. If a country does not have a PSI, it requires typically an IMF verified 
poverty reduction strategy in place to get the ESF. It would be sad and indeed ironic if 
poverty increased because of IMF delays in approving lending just because the 
country did not have a verified poverty reduction strategy! As discussed, this is 
inappropriate given that the shock was exogenous. It would also delay disbursements 
whilst the programme was negotiated; as discussed above, such delays can be very 
costly in terms of growth and poverty reduction foregone.  
 
A third problem is that to get an ESF, the PSI has to be suspended, which several 
countries find problematic;4 this is an anomaly, which could be easily changed. 
 
A final problem is that the second window (the ESF) places an annual limit of 25 per 
cent of quota, and a total limit of 50 per cent quota for the facility. The Fund document 
accepts that "this is less than the estimated impact of various shocks" (IMF, 2005b). It 
gives two justifications: the first one is that it is similar to PRGF augmentation (but as 
discussed above, these are clearly insufficient as they meet only a small proportion of 
the size of the shock); the second is the constraint on PRGF Trust resources for the 
subsidy element. Though this may be factually correct, donors –in the context of 
increasing aid initiatives— could allocate additional resources to the PRGF Trust, 
which would be very effective in terms of poverty alleviation. Indeed, the IMF should 
encourage them to do so.   
 
The fact that no country has used the ESF seems to indicate that the problems in its 
design outweigh potential benefits. 
 
b) EU grants for export shortfalls 
 
The EU has for a long time, since 1975, had compensatory mechanisms in the form of 
grants for ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries hit by terms of trade 
shocks. Initially, these were instruments like Stabex and Sysmin, which expired with 
the Lomé Convention, signed between the European Union and the ACP countries. A 
new mechanism was created under Cotonou, FLEX, which according to the European 
Commission (2005), resulted from the negotiation between the Community that 
wanted to put an end to Stabex and Sysmin, and ACP countries, which wanted to 
maintain these instruments, with some adaptations. The resulting mechanism –FLEX– 
seems to disburse less funds than previous ones (see below) but has the advantage 
over previous EU instruments that it is more targeted on the shocks, rather than on 
how the resources should be used (for more details, see Griffith-Jones and Gottschalk, 
2005). 
 
                                                 
4 Interview material 
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FLEX has as purpose to support “in cases of short-term fluctuations in export earnings 
safeguard macro-economic and sectoral reforms that are at risk as a result of a drop in 
revenue…”.  It is curious that it does not explicitly mention support of imports, or 
growth, or poverty reduction, as an aim. 
 
FLEX was set up within the broad grants financial envelope that supports long-term 
development of ACP countries. It is part of the national allocations within the so-
called Envelope B, to meet unforeseen needs (which include also 
humanitarian/emergency assistance and debt relief). Envelope A defines 
programmable aid for 5 years. Envelope B can currently be used by 76 ACP countries, 
implying a fairly small allocation per country, as the total amount is relatively small. It 
is important to point out that the budget for FLEX has a further upper limit, 
determined for every ACP country. This limit is calculated on the basis of historic 
vulnerability, which may not always be a good forecaster of current vulnerability. This 
limit can restrict granting of approved resources, as indeed happened for example in 
the case of Guyana.  Greater flexibility of allocation between countries of FLEX 
resources may be desirable, but has reportedly been resisted by ACP countries. 
However, if in future negotiations FLEX is modified by the European Community in 
ways that ACP countries would consider desirable (e.g. higher levels of resources, 
and/or more flexible criteria, as well as greater speed of disbursement), perhaps ACP 
countries could in their turn accept greater flexibility in intra-country allocation within 
Envelope B. 
 
There are two criteria for ACP countries to be able to access FLEX. The first one is 
that export revenues should fall by 10 per cent (2 per cent for least developed, 
landlocked and island). The second is that there should be a 10 per cent increase in the 
public deficit (criteria which after the recent June 2004 modification was reduced to 2 
per cent deterioration). 
 
As regards the criteria of export revenues, the question could be asked whether a fall 
of 10 per cent in export values is not too stringent, and whether a level of exports 
below trend of growth would not be more appropriate, as argued above. Furthermore, 
it would seem essential to measure export shortfalls in terms of purchasing power 
(capacity to import). This is particularly relevant and urgent as currently a number of 
ACP countries are suffering from a large increase in oil and food prices, but is more 
broadly applicable. 
 
Though it is welcome that the criteria for public deficit increases has been made less 
stringent (which has facilitated larger FLEX drawings), it seems conceptually unclear 
why any criteria for worsening of fiscal deficits needs to be included, given that the 
main concern should be safeguarding countries’ import and growth capacity. This was 
also the position of the ACP countries during FLEX negotiations. There is also a 
contradiction between FLEX requiring countries to increase fiscal deficits as a pre-
condition for grants, and IMF PRGFs, which typically do not allow countries to 
increase fiscal deficits (even though in the face of shocks, such deficits should be 
allowed to increase to sustain the level of economic activity and imports as discussed 
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above). Therefore, one of the desirable changes is to eliminate the deficit deterioration 
criteria as a pre-condition for FLEX disbursements. 
 
The scale of FLEX disbursements was initially very modest, though it has increased 
somewhat since it was modified, both in terms of number of countries and amounts 
eligible for grants, which reached 13 countries and 77 million euros for 2003, with a 
similar amount estimated for 2004. Based on EC information, it can be calculated that 
if there had been no public deficit criteria in 2003, the number of countries that could 
have received grants would have increased quite significantly. 
 
There is also a more immediate problem of availability of resources. Even though 17 
countries were eligible for FLEX resources in 2003, only 13 got the grants, because in 
four cases country-specific resources were already exhausted, when the country 
became eligible for FLEX. 
 
Thus, there is not just a problem of possible adaptation of criteria, but also a limitation 
of resources, which impedes countries meeting criteria receiving the grants. This 
seems to need urgent attention. 
 
In this context, it is important to stress that FLEX seems a far smaller facility than 
Stabex in terms of aid disbursements (even though its design may be better). Indeed, 
Stabex represented about 18 per cent of total aid during Lomé IV, and 31 per cent in 
Lomé III.  For countries that benefited from the instrument, it reached over 60 per cent 
during Lomé III and IV. 
 
Once a country meets the criteria, and it has a satisfactory macroeconomic situation 
(established either because it has an IMF programme or as evaluated by European 
Commission economists), it can receive FLEX as programme support. In 
macroeconomic aspects, except for the rather strange fiscal criteria, FLEX 
conditionality seems relatively flexible. If the macroeconomic situation is not 
satisfactory, the country can receive funding via new projects. This will add further 
time that the country needs to wait, in what is already a rather lengthy process. 
Reportedly, negotiations with the European Commission can become protracted. As 
time is of the essence, to avoid unnecessary import compression, ways could be found 
to accelerate disbursements. For example, in the original IMF’s CFF, shortfalls could 
be calculated not just for the calendar year, but for any 12 month-period (thus not 
waiting necessarily for December). 
 
Whilst it is true that FLEX has a number of limitations (problems in its criteria, 
slowness of disbursements, apparent restrictions on resources, and somewhat small 
scale), it does have several advantages, of which perhaps the main one from the ACP 
countries’ perspective is that it gives grants. However, if FLEX were to be improved, 
and its limitations modified, one major problem would remain.  FLEX only is 
available for ACP countries, which excludes a large number of low-income countries, 
especially in Asia, though some also in Latin America. Indeed, countries like 
Nicaragua –which has been hit by recurrent shocks– cannot apply for FLEX, though it 
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would greatly benefit from it. The EU does have programmes in those two regions, but 
not of the kind that FLEX belongs to. This poses a dilemma for how a programme like 
FLEX could be generalised to include other low-income countries, besides the ACP 
ones, and possibly also how other (non-European) donors could be integrated. We will 
return to these broader architecture issues below. 
 
c) IMF support for trade-related balance of payments adjustments 
 
Whatever the limitations of financing terms of trade shocks, it is very positive that the 
IMF introduced in 2004 a new mechanism (the Trade Integration Mechanism, or TIM) 
to mitigate negative effects of WTO agreements that might give rise to temporary 
balance of payment shortfalls. It does not, however, deal with more long-term effects 
of WTO agreements. 
 
A balance of payments need might result from the erosion of tariff preferences in 
important export markets, adverse changes in food terms of trade, or the expiration (in 
2005) of quotas under the WTO’s textiles agreement. According to the IMF, 
“shortfalls are unlikely to be large for most countries, and would eventually be 
dominated by the positive impact of more open trade. Nevertheless, they could be 
significant in the short run for some countries” (IMF, 2004b). 
 
TIM details how the Fund would provide access to its resources to meet a balance of 
payments need associated with trade-related adjustments. In particular, the IMF 
would: 
 
• discuss with countries facing such balance of payments shortfalls, new 
arrangements within its existing lending facilities (i.e. the Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Facility (PRGF); 
 
• take into account the anticipated impact of the trade adjustment in a 
member’s balance of payments in determining size of access under both new 
and existing arrangements (the “baseline feature”); and 
 
• be prepared to augment arrangements under simplified procedures if the 
actual balance of payments effect turns out to be larger than anticipated (the 
“deviation feature”). 
 
The TIM is not a special facility. Rather, it is a policy designed to increase the 
predictability of resource availability under existing facilities. 
 
The TIM is expected to create an increase in IMF financing, for two reasons. First, the 
explicit emphasis on trade adjustments will ensure that they are carefully estimated 
and incorporated into the Fund-supported programme. Second, the deviation feature 
provides countries with a greater degree of certainty that larger-than-anticipated 
adjustments can be accommodated. 
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A member country could request consideration under the TIM if it expects a net 
balance of payment shortfall as a result of measures implemented by other countries 
that result in more open and non-discriminatory market access. Such measures would 
normally be introduced either (i) under a WTO agreement or (ii) on a non-
discriminatory basis. 
 
The design of TIM seems to have very positive features, which could very usefully be 
applied to facilities dealing with terms of trade shocks.  This relates to having both an 
ex-ante baseline scenario, and a deviation augmentation feature; furthermore, 
augmentation lending due to deviations from baseline “would not normally involve 
any additional conditionality” (IMF 2004b). 
 
Table 3 below summarizes total IMF lending for external shocks in the 2005 – early 2008 
period, under PRGF augmentation, ESF (zero amount until now) and the new TIM. The 
total amount, under 200 million SDR, is extremely small and well below that forecast by 
the IMF itself. 
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Table 3 - Total IMF compensatory financing for low income countries (2005 - Jan. 2008)5 




(in % of 
quota) 
Date Approved Reason 





 Kenya Augmentation 50.0 18.4 20 Dec 2004 Rising oil prices 
drought 
 Azerbaijan Reduction 12.9 8.0 22 Dec 2004 Cancellation of o
review 
       
2006 Niger Augmentation 19.7 29.9 14 Nov 2005 Severe drought a
terms of trade 
deterioration 
       
2007 Burkina Faso Augmentation 6.0 10.0 8 Sept 2006 Decline in terms 
trade 






 Kenya Reduction 75.0 27.6 11 April 2007 Improved extern
position 
       
2008 Burkina Faso Augmentation 9.0 15.0 9 Jan 2008 Expected decline
cotton exports an
rise in oil import
 
Total6   80.9    
 
Source: IMF Annual Reports 2005, 2006, 2007, POD database. We thank Mark Plant, from the IMF, for providing recent 
data. 
                                                 
5 These figures include augmentation of PRGF, due to terms of trade shocks or trade regime changes the 
new ESF (External Shocks Facility) for non-PRGF countries was not used at all. 
6 The total reflects net flows, equal to augmentation minus reduction. 
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IV Policy recommendations on a shock architecture 
 
The world economy –and developing countries—have changed since compensatory 
financing was first introduced. In particular, as a group, developing countries are now 
less dependent on commodity exports. However, many low-income countries are still 
very dependent on a few –or one—commodity exports, and several low, as well as 
middle-income, countries have high dependence on oil and food imports. The latter is 
particularly problematic, as their prices have increased sharply and rapidly. As a result, 
they are still vulnerable to terms of trade shocks, and in practice have few options to 
moderate their impact. The consequence has been a high degree of macroeconomic 
volatility, which is precisely what the international financial system should aim to 
address so that long-term growth is not undermined. Therefore, appropriate official 
compensatory financing mechanisms have a very important role to play. Temporarily, 
commodity prices are on the whole high; however, it is very probable that there will be 
declines in these prices, especially as the world economy is quickly slowing down. And, 
of course, many developing countries are adversely affected by high commodity, 
particularly, food and energy, prices. 
 
The following broad suggestions are borne from the analysis above and from the relevant 
literature, and complement the six criteria for compensatory financing developed in the 
second section of this paper: 
 
1. Scaling up  
 
The scale of existing facilities, and of resources –including for grants and for 
subsidies to allow concessionality financing of loans—are too small, in proportion to 
the shocks. This seems perhaps the most important conclusion of this paper.  
 
In a context of scaling up of aid and/or innovative sources of finance, higher 
resources should be allocated for financing shocks. This would need to be linked to 
fewer restrictions (e.g. higher per cent of IMF quota for access, expansion of limits 
and availability of resources for FLEX) on the scale of facilities, so that a far larger 
proportion of shortfalls of exports could be financed. 
 
In spite of the many limitations, FLEX is a useful instrument. Its major problem is 
limited scale, which should be therefore significantly increased (see above for more 
specific proposals). Also, some peculiar conditionalities (particularly those associated 
with budget deficits) should be dropped. 
 
2. Both loans and grants are valuable 
 
In the case of low-income countries, grants are more useful for more permanent 
shocks, or shocks (e.g. natural disasters) with more permanent effects. However, 
official lending has an important role to play as potentially speedy, and may provide 
incentives for changes in economy, to reduce its vulnerability. For middle-income 
countries, loans play a particularly valuable role. 
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Closer coordination between institutions providing loans and grants seems urgent. 
 
3. IMF lending for trade shocks need far reaching changes 
 
There should be significant simplification of IMF facilities as they are too many (e.g. 
enhanced PRGF, ESF and TIM) and are too complex. Indeed, low-income countries 
are not even acquainted with – or fully understand – all the facilities available. 
 
Indeed, though the focus of our proposal is on how to improve existing IMF facilities, 
an option to consider may be to merge all these IMF trade compensatory financing for 
low-income countries into one low conditional facility at the IMF. 
 
Lower conditionality is clearly needed. There is no justification for upper credit 
conditionality for external shocks, for countries with reasonable policies. A possible 
way forward to avoid excessive conditionality in times of shock, that could be more 
acceptable to the IMF, would be for countries with PRGFs, PSIs or other shadow 
programmes, to have a baseline scenario for their programme, but embedded into 
them automatic augmentations for terms of trade or other external shocks. 
 
Concessionality of lending (possibly even higher than now) is highly desirable, 
especially for heavily indebted low-income countries. 
 
It would be very important if export shortfalls were measured in terms of export 
purchasing power (or, what is equivalent, import capacity), or – should this not be 
done – if a new Oil Facility was activated at the IMF, and if all financing shocks 
facilities included all food imports (and not just cereals). Economic analysis shows 
clearly that the relevant variable is capacity to import. 
 
Though apparently less urgent, conditionality on the CFF should be lowered, to help 
middle-income countries deal with possible trade shocks. 
 
 
4. Grants need a focal point 
 
A potential focal point for all grants for this purpose could be the European 
Commission. However, the key problem for the Community being a focal point is 
coverage of countries, as many low-income countries are excluded; also other donors 
would have to be included. 
 
An alternative is for the World Bank to play a coordinating role, in assessing (with 
possible help from the IMF) country needs, and linking up with donors to provide 
necessary resources for trade or other shocks. The conditions under which such aid 
would be given should be particularly linked to diversification of the economy, and 
other measures to decrease countries’ vulnerability to shocks. Though well qualified 
for this latter role, a problem may be that the World Bank has limited experience in 
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systematically dealing with providing finance for trade shocks. Though its 
programmes sometimes are expanded as a result of such shocks, the World Bank does 
not have specific facilities to deal with them; the fact that the World Bank has 
recently launched a disaster facility may facilitate the World Bank’s role in 
responding to trade shocks. However, countries themselves seem to prefer dealing 
with bilateral donors, which they consider more agile.   
 
5. Creativity needed in bilateral or multilateral lending 
 
Of particular interest as regards bilateral concessional loans is the new French 
counter-cyclical lending instrument, which has been used already by Senegal and 
Burkina-Faso. It allows countries to stop servicing debt (up to a maximum of five 
years in total) in cases when they have an export shortfall. There seems to be a case 
for other donors to make similar loans and/or for institutions like the World Bank or 
regional development banks to consider lending in such a manner, or via other 
mechanisms (e.g. growth-linked loans) that allow lower payments in bad times, and 






Cohen, Daniel, Hélène Djoufelkit-Cottenet, Pierre Jacquet and Cécile Valadier (2008), 
“Lending to the poorest countries: A new counter-cyclical debt instrument”, 
OECD Development Centre. 
 
Collier, Paul and Jan Dehn (2001), “Aid, Shocks and Growth”, World Bank Working Paper 
2688.  Washington DC. 
 
Cortez, Ana, Alex Izurieta and Rob Vos (2008), “The worsening global outlook and global 
policy responses with special reference to the poorest countries”, UN-DESA, 
mimeo. 
 
Goreux, Louis M. (1980), Compensatory Financing Facility.  Pamphlet Series No. 34.  
IMF, Washington DC. 
 
Griffith-Jones, Stephany (1987), “Compensatory Financing Facility; A review of its 
operation and proposals for improvement” in S. Dell (ed) The International 
Monetary System and its Reform, North Holland, New York and Oxford. 
 
____ and Ricardo Gottschalk (2005), “Compensatory Financing for Shocks: What Changes 
Needed?”, The Institute of Development Studies (www.ids.ac.uk). 
 
Guillaumant, Patrick, Sylviane Guillaumont Jeanneney, Pierre Jacquet, Lisa Chauvet and 
Bertrand Savoye (2003), “Attenuating through aid the vulnerability to price shocks”, 
Prepared for ABCDE Europe conference, May 2003, Paris. 
 
IMF (2003), “Fund Assistance for Countries Facing Exogenous Shocks”, August 8 2003. 
 
____ (2004a), “Review of the Compensatory Financing Mechanism”, IMF, February 18 
2004. 
 
____ (2004b), “Fund support for Trade-Related Balance of Payments Adjustments”, IMF, 
February 23 2004. 
 
____ (2005a), “Strengthening the Fund’s Ability to Assist Low-Income Countries Meet 
Balance of Payments Needs Arising from Sudden and Exogenous Shocks”.  
EBS/05188, June 10 2005. 
 
____ (2005b), “Financing the Continuation of the PRGF and the Establishment of a 
Window Within the PRGF Trust for Needs Arising from Exogenous Shocks”, June 
10 2005. 
 
Ocampo, José Antonio (2002), “Recasting the International Financial Agenda”, in John 
Eatwell and Lance Taylor (eds.), International Capital Markets: Systems in 
Transition, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 22
 
____ and María Ángela Parra (2003), “The Terms of Trade for Commodities in the 
Twentieth Century”, ECLAC Review, No. 79, April. 
 
____ and ____ (2007), “The Dual Divergence: Growth Successes and Collapses in the 
Developing World Since 1980”, in Ricardo Ffrench-Davis and José Luis Machinea 
(eds.), Economic Growth with Equity: Challenges for Latin America, Houndmills, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan and ECLAC. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph E. (2006), Making Globalization Work, New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company.  
 
Rodrik, Dani (2006), “The Social Cost of Foreign Exchange Reserves”, NBER Working 
Paper No. W11952, January 2006. 
 
United Nations, Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs (1999), Towards a 
New International Financial Architecture, January 21. 
 
